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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee/Cross Appellant Richard S. Hart ("Mr. Hart") concurs with 
Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in finding that Salt 
Lake County voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned any defenses 
it may have had based upon governmental immunity? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that Salt Lake County did not waive any 
defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity, did the Trial 
Court abuse its discretion in finding that Salt Lake County failed to 
introduce evidence to prove the discretionary function exception? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. 
3. Did the Trial Court err in concluding that Salt Lake County 
owed a duty of care to Mr. Hart with respect to the design, 
construction and maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of law. 
4. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying Salt Lake 
County's untimely motion for new trial, based upon, among other things, 
its failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P. 59(c)? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
5. Did the Trial Court err in concluding that the holding in 
Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) did not represent a 
change in the law sufficient to support Salt Lake County's Motion for 
Relief from Judgment? 
1 
Standard of Review: Correctness of Law. 
6. Assuming, arguendo, Salt Lake County's Rule 59 motion was not 
procedurally defective, did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
permitting Mr. Hart to summarize his medical expenses and the general 
nature of his settlement with co-defendant Robert E. Tweedy in argument 
at trial? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
7. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in refusing to 
submit the issue of Mr. Hart's comparative fault to the jury, where 
Salt Lake County stipulated pretrial to the exclusion of Mr. Hart from 
the special verdict form and where no evidence existed to support a 
finding of fault? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
8. Did the Trial Court err in applying the Damages Cap found in 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-3 0-34, where Salt Lake County knowingly waived 
and abandoned any defense it may have had based on governmental 
immunity? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of law. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16, 
1460-62). 
9. Does application of the Damages Cap found in Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 63-30-34 violate Mr. Hart's constitutional rights? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of law. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16, 
1460-62). 
2 
10. Did the Trial Court err in excluding pre-judgment interest, 
post judgment interest and costs from its award of damages in the 
Judgment on Verdict in a Civil Action? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of Law. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16, 
1460-62). 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sees. 1, 7, 11 and 24 Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34(l)(b) 
Utah Cons. Art. V Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44 
Utah Const. Art. VI, Sec. 26 Utah Civ. 8(c) 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4(2) Utah R. Civ. 12(h) 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 Utah R, Civ. 59 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4 Utah R. Civ. 60(b) 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Mr. Hart concurs with Salt Lake County's 
Nature of the Case, except that it should identify the accident 
location as Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake County, Utah, and state Salt 
Lake County owned Wasatch Boulevard at the time of the accident and for 
more than 35 years prior thereto. Further, Mr. Hart alleged Salt Lake 
County was negligent in failing to design, engineer and construct 
Wasatch Boulevard. (R. 1101) 
B. Course of Proceedings. Mr. Hart concurs in Salt Lake County's 
statement of the Course of Proceedings, except as follows: 
Salt Lake County's Reply Memorandum regarding its Motion for 
3 
Summary Judgment (R. 42 0) dropped the governmental immunity argument. 
Salt Lake County did not raise or argue the immunity defense at the 
time of oral argument on the motion (R. 498-511) and, knowingly 
abandoned the immunity argument at such hearing. (R. 508). Salt Lake 
County did not raise or argue the immunity defense thereafter. (R. 
1452-1459). 
At an August 23, 1994 pretrial conference in camera, Salt Lake 
County informed the Trial Court there was no evidence of comparative 
fault against Mr. Hart. (R. 1454, 2386). 
Mr. Hart opposed Salt Lake County's Motion to Limit the Amount of 
Judgment (R. 1157-74) and submitted a form of judgment, which included 
interest (pre-judgment and post judgment) and costs. (R. 1214-1216). 
The September 7, 1995 Order included findings conclusions regarding 
comparative fault and waiver of governmental immunity, among other 
things. (R. 1452-1459). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Hart's Amended Complaint alleges Salt Lake County was 
liable for injuries suffered in a December 24, 1986 traffic accident on 
Wasatch Boulevard, a Salt Lake County owned and maintained highway. (R. 
79-90) . 
2. In its Answer, Salt Lake County raised the defense of 
governmental immunity as affirmative defense (R. 102, 107). 
3. On December 12, 1991, Salt Lake County filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on three specific grounds: (1) governmental immunity, 
(2) negligence, and (3) causation. (R. 290, 293, 296-300). In 
4 
response, Mr. Hart filed an opposing memorandum, arguing governmental 
immunity was not available. (R. 363, 369-376). In reply, Salt Lake 
County abandoned the immunity argument. (R. 420-429) . 
4. During the March 9, 1992 oral argument, Salt Lake County 
abandoned its immunity defense, and argued that the negligence of 
Robert E. Tweedy was the sole cause of Mr. Hart's injuries. (R. 508-
509) . 
5. In entering an April 13, 1992 Order that Mr. Hartfs injuries 
were solely caused by Mr. Tweedy, the Trial Court did not reference the 
abandoned immunity argument. (R. 488-489). 
6. On May 1, 1992, Mr. Hart appealed (R. 490-491), the Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded. (R. 514). 
7. In subsequent proceedings, Salt Lake County did not raise or 
preserve the governmental immunity defense. (R. 967-1030). Only the 
issues of duty, negligence and causation were . (R. 1452-59). 
8. At the August 23, 1994 pretrial conference in camera, counsel 
for Salt Lake County indicated they had no evidence of comparative 
fault against Mr. Hart and acquiesced in striking Mr. Hart from the 
Special Verdict form. (R. 2385, 2386). 
9. On September 2, 1994, a $1,33 0,000 verdict was entered for 
Mr. Hart, finding Salt Lake County's comparative negligence to be 51%. 
(R. 1139-40). 
10. Mr. Hart submitted a form Judgment On Verdict In Civil 
Action. (R. 1214-1216). On September 13, 1994, Salt Lake County moved 
to limit the Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34. (R. 1152). 
5 
11. On December 6, 1994, the Court granted the Motion. (R. 
1207), and on January 24, 1995, entered a Judgment for $250,000, 
excluding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and costs. (R. 
1263) . 
12. In its February 1, 1995 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Motion for Remittitur (R. 1267), 
Salt Lake County failed to raise governmental immunity and, although it 
raised comparative fault, it argued only that more fault should have 
been attributed to Mr. Tweedy, not to Mr. Hart. (R. 1269-1282). 
13. A supporting affidavit was not filed within twenty days of 
Salt Lake County's filing of its Motion for New Trial. The Affidavit 
of Michael E. Postma was not filed until March 3, 1995. (R. 1303). 
14. On September 7, 1995, the Court entered a Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying the motion and ruling Salt Lake 
County knowingly waived its immunity defenses. (R. 1452-1459). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Salt Lake County is not immune from suit because of the statutory 
waiver of immunity and its own express waiver and abandonment of any 
immunity defense it may have had. Even if Salt Lake County had the 
right to argue governmental immunity, it failed to introduce any 
evidence in support of such a defense. The record does not support a 
finding of discretionary function immunity. Salt Lake County owed a 
duty of care to Mr. Hart with regard to the design, construction and 
maintenance of Wasatch Blvd. Salt Lake County is not entitled to 
relief from the jury verdict because its post-trial motions were 
6 
properly denied by the Trial Court. 
Imposition of a damages cap violated Mr Hart's constitutional 
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I. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR ITS NEGLIGENT FAILURE 
TO DESIGN, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN WASATCH BOULEVARD IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION, 
A. The Utah Legislature Has Expressly Waived Governmental 
Immunity For Injuries Arising Out of Defective, Unsafe Or 
Dangerous Conditions On Highways. 
1\\* ( i u r l . i i i H l i t i n iV(-j i i i m e i i t d .1 i i m n i u i n l y lui i I n n q « \ > : . i s l e d a ii iiiiiii il t e r 
of common law m he Suate of i: ^ 1 . Condemarin v. University Hosp., 
775 P.zu 34 n, 34s vut:av- ;uP: Following the enactment of* the Utah 
Governmental ,mmunity Act in 1966, Utah Code Ann. Sec. bJ JU I, et. 
seq,
 szhe "Act"), a "governmental entity performing governmental 
functions was immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity 
contained in Section 63-30-3 " McCorvey v ™--?^ State Dept. of 
Transi 8^« P.2d 41, (Utah 1993) Notwithstanding this general 
grant Il iminumly, I In-1 llldli SI dl, <•'" Legisla* 
injuries caused by "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road or other structure located on them." Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30 8 (1953, as amended)- -Immunity is specifica] 1 v waived 
for all governmental entities . . . (4) for defective highways. 
bridges, and other structures . . . . " Condemarin <' 'r P "Ml at 350 
7 
(emphasis added)-1 
The jury concluded that "Salt Lake County was "negligent in 
performing . . . one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged 
by the Plaintiff." (R. 1139). Plaintiff's claims of negligence 
included (1) failure to properly design, engineer and construct Wasatch 
Boulevard, (2) failure to install adequate protective devices and 
features, including appropriate escape lanes, and (3) negligent 
maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard in a dangerous and hazardous 
condition. (R. 1101). Obviously, Salt Lake County's liability arises 
out of circumstances for which there has been a specific statutory 
waiver of immunity. As discussed, infra, consistent with Salt Lake 
County's express waiver of governmental immunity, Salt Lake County did 
not introduce any evidence to rebut the statutory waiver of immunity or 
to prove the performance of a discretionary function. 
B. Contrary To The Argument Of Salt Lake County, Governmental 
Immunity Is An Affirmative Defense, Which Is Subject To 
Waiver. 
Salt Lake County contends that governmental immunity is not an 
affirmative defense and can be raised as a jurisdictional issue at any 
time. This argument is a feeble attempt to avoid the fatal effect of 
(i) the County's voluntary waiver and abandonment of any defense 
relating to immunity in the proceedings below and (ii) its failure to 
1
 Utah's Governmental Immunity Act provides both for the general grant of governmental immunity, and for the 
waiver thereof, in 1983, the legislature amended the Act, albeit arbitrarily and discriminatorily, to limit the waiver of 
immunity by capping damages recoverable from the government at $250,000. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34. This 
demonstrates the government's power to waive immunity and to modify that waiver as it sees fit. See Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1990) ("the Act was structured such that immunity was granted generally and waived.. 
. specifically."). 
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introduce evidence or argument in the pretrial or trial proceedings 
with respect to the "discretionary function" exception to the waiver of 
: s. at 3 1 I .] ; e 3 : i u L1 .5 m . i staken] y i el i es i t;poii an i napplicable line 
of federal cases that do not apply to an analysis of state governmental 
immunity Utah and other state courts have repeatedly held that 
sovereign minimi i I "„" i s iin af f iinirit ive deterihi „ .illiiii 1 nii"l I K 1 a s s e i f e d 
and proved to be effective. Ironically, Salt Lake County ignores its 
own repeated reference to governmental immunity as an affirmative 
defense.2 
Utah appellate courts agree that governmental immunity is an 
"affirmative defense" and s subject to waiver. In Nelson by and 
through Stuckmai -..* . Lake City, 919 P. 2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted *:he Utah Supreme Court unanimously held, 
1
 • n: ni n :i :ii 1 5 :i s <: * - u-., e n s e wh i c 1 1 mu s t b e p r o ve d b> t he 
defendant." See -i\. s\. ' .,i State of Utah, 882 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Utah 
App II 9 94) (Bench, J „, concurring in result), citing Feree, 784 P.2d 
149, 152-53 (Utah 1989) ("Sovereign immunity, however, is an 
affirmative defense'. . . ); and Ambus v U tah State Bd. Of Educ, 
For example, in its February 13, 1989 Answer, Salt Lake County raised the 
Governmental Immunity Act as its "Fourth Defense". (R. 107). Salt Lake County 
even admits that it "raised governmental immunity as a defense" in its answer. 
(Applt. Brief at 5). At the hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment, Salt Lake 
County's attorney responded affirmatively when asked by Judge Sawaya if he was 
"abandoning the Immunity argument". (R. 508). In its Reply Memorandum dated June 
16, 1995, Salt Lake County argued, "[e]ven if the County waived its immunity 
defense . . ." (R. 1412) and specifically referred to its "immunity defense" 
elsewhere in its memorandum. (R. 1407, 1409). On the basis of Salt Lake County's 
abandonment of the defense and given its failure to introduce evidence or argument 
in the trial proceedings, the Trial Court ruled Salt Lake County's "affirmative 
defense" had been waived, abandoned and not pursued at trial. (R #1453, 1456, 
2376). 
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858 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1993) (Qualified immunity is an affirmative 
defense). Recognition of immunity as an affirmative defense implicitly 
recognizes that immunity may be waived. 
It is settled Utah law that affirmative defenses can be waived 
under a variety of circumstances.3 Salt Lake County's assertion that 
"this issue is one of first impression in Utah" cannot be taken 
seriously. The sole Utah case cited by Salt Lake County to support its 
position is easily distinguished because it dealt solely with the 
notice requirement of the Act. Nielsen v. Gurley, 888 p.2d 130, 134 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Other state courts are in agreement with the Utah position that 
governmental immunity is an affirmative defense, which is subject to 
waiver. In Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex. 
1988), the court found that the City of San Antonio failed to raise 
governmental immunity as a defense until after the case was tried, and 
held: "the City waived any immunity defense by failing to affirmatively 
plead it." Id. at 523. The Davis court also rejected the same 
argument advanced by Salt Lake County in this appeal that governmental 
immunity presents a subject matter jurisdiction question: 
We do not read our opinion in Duhart as holding that the trial 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (if a party fails to plead an affirmative defense 
when required to do so, the defense is waived); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (failure to 
raise most non-jurisdictional defenses constitutes waiver); State v. Perank, 858 
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted) ("Res judicata is an affirmative 
defense . . . and therefore is waivable."). Federal cases construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 
8(c) are consistent. See Moore's Federal Practice, §#8.27 [3] (Supp. 1996) ("party 
who should have pleaded the defense is precluded from introducing evidence in 
support of it, or receiving a jury instruction concerning the defense, and the 
court cannot decide the case on the basis of that defense"). 
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court lacked subject matter jurisdiction . . .and that any 
judgment . . .would have been void. We further perceive no 
unfairness in requiring governmental units to plead their immunity 
in order to avoid liability on that ground. We conclude 
that sovereign immunity may not be asserted as a jurisdictional 
obstacle to the trial court's power to hear cases against 
governmental defendants. 
Id. at 520. 
•'; int- ,^..iorado i.'ouM I /IppeaJi; agree,'.!. '*-••?*• - • and 
County of Denver, ^ * : - (Colo. App. 1988), plaintiff sued the 
i i v" "llf Center f i io- r^ hiring of police officers At trial, 
after the City had mistakenly concluded it was insured aga-:•::>•-
plaintiff's claims, counsel conceded in oral argument u [i]f the jury 
I.- e. Valdez was assaulted and battered, the City, 
by its pleadings has already agreed to pay his damages. . . ." at 
395. Mr. Valdez argued that the City's concession constituted a waiver 
oi the sovereign immunity defense. Agreeing n ' Mi I'alde,,, " 'u \?s/d-
court applied garden variety waiver analysis to the governmental 
defense: "Waiver is a voluntary abandonment or surrender by 
competent persons oi a right known to exist. . . . Liai 
where immunity has not been raised as a defense by a public entity 
." Id. T! -.1 , circumstances at issue, 
these statements, together with the City's limited assertion of 
immunity were sufficient to constitute an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity as a defense t r \IMJIJH(1 I I J J HI . . . „" id. 
As discussed in Section I.C., infra, the factual similarities 
between Valdez din I I h< i tu l dtil n;ase are 1^ ill \\n\ li I ] : • : tl i ::ia ses, the 
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government's express waiver of immunity was made by counsel in oral 
argument. (R. 1456). The Trial Court's holding in this case squares 
with Valdez and is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 
Nelson. Numerous other state courts are in accord.4 
Salt Lake County's reliance upon a line of cases analyzing 
discretionary function immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("FTCA") is misplaced and misleading. The argument does not apply to 
this Court's analysis of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Salt Lake 
County has not and cannot cite Utah case law in support of its 
position. The interpretation by federal courts of defenses under the 
FTCA is limited to an analysis of immunity under the FTCA. Even other 
federal court decisions which have considered the nature of the 
immunity defense in contexts other than the FTCA have ruled that 
immunity must be raised or it will be waived.5 
Salt Lake County's argument, that governmental immunity should not 
be construed as an affirmative defense on the basis of selected federal 
4See City of Dallas v. Cox, 793 S.W.2d 701, 728 (Tex. App. 1990) (When answer of governmental defendant is 
stricken as a discovery sanction, one of the consequences is waiver of defense of governmental immunity); Ramirez v. 
City ofRedondo Beach, 229 Cal.Rptr. 917,922 (Cal. App.1986) (Immunity is an affirmative defense to liability for the 
dangerous condition of public property and must be pleaded and proved by the public entity); Jackson v. City of Kansas 
City, 680 P.2d 877, 886 (Kan. 1984) (Burden is on the governmental entity to establish governmental immunity); Scovill 
v. City of Astoria, 878 P.2d 1127,1128 (Or. App. 1994) ("It is the city's burden to establish immunity, not plaintiffs to 
negate it."); Gibson v. City of Grand Rapids, 412 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Mich. App. 1987) ("'Immunity granted by law' is an 
affirmative defense which must be raised in the governmental agency's responsive pleading."); McCummings v. Hurley 
Medical Center, 446 N.W.2d 114,117 (Mich. 1989) (Governmental immunity treated no differently from any other type 
of immunity; must be pled as an affirmative defense); Stryker v. City of Atlanta, 738 F. Supp. 1423,1431 (N.D. Ga. 1990) 
(Purchase of liability insurance waives sovereign immunity to the extent of the insured amount). 
5
 Notably, the Trial Court's decision is in keeping with long-established law. See Chrysler Corp. V. United 
States, 190 F. Supp. 412,414 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (held affirmative defense waived, where "defendant did not address itself 
to this issue, and a t . . . oral arguments,... expressly stated that it wished to withdraw the defense"); Walsh v. Mellas, 837 
F.2d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 1988) F.O.P. Lodge No. 121 v. City ofHobart, 864 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1988); Maul v. 
Constan, 928 F.2d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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court decisions, even ignores a recent observation in AIG Aviation 
Insur. Srvcs., Inc. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 14 96, 1503 (D. Utah 
19^b; The AIG court stated, [d]espite Die : iiiuidiii les LII language 
between the state and federal [FTCA] discretionary function exceptions, 
t Interpreted differently " Sa] t Lake 
County's suggestion that this court should disregard well-settled state 
law in favor of an inapplicable line of federal cases is without merit. 
C. Salt Lake County Specifically And Voluntarily Waived And 
Abandoned Any Litigation Defense Relating To Governmental 
Immunity 
Salt Lake County argues its open court waiver ot Hit* immunity 
defense should be deemed ineffectual on appeal on the basis that such 
waiver was allegedly not an intentional, unequivocal relinquishment of 
the defense. In support, Salt Lake County has selectively cited only 
five lines from the record (R. 508-09). Salt Lake County's failed to 
advise this Court of the full context of the Court's direct question 
regarding abandonment. Comments made by counsel for Mr. Hart 
specifically addressed Mr. McKnight's decision not to raise the 
i irinui i .' 'i l i e f e n s e « '.'id." u i M iriii i : <,! J Trip ha s i R a d d e d ) : 
I would understand from the argument that the issues with 
reference to the immunity defense are not being pursued. 1 
believe there's an express waiver of immunity in this case. If 
Your Honor has any questions about that, I would be happy to 
answer that 
( Coi i s lde i a t i oi I : -f the fi ill 1 coi i t ex t • : f tl: le e xcl lange giv es 
proper emphasis to counsel's affirmative abandonment of "the immunity 
argument." (R. 508). It is axiomatic that counsel of record has 
authority to bind his client based upon statements, admissions or 
arguments advanced on the record. 
This Court should also note that while Salt Lake County has 
downplayed the foregoing exchange, its in-court abandonment of the 
immunity defense occurred after it had briefed the discretionary 
function issue. (R. 296-300). Salt Lake County did not address 
immunity in its reply, nor did it refer to immunity at oral argument, 
and made the express waiver noted above.6 In course, Salt Lake County 
did not raise or argue an immunity defense in its motion for new trial. 
When the issue was raised for the first time during belated post-
judgment proceedings, the Trial Court found (R. 1453-54) and ruled Salt 
Lake County's conduct constituted a waiver of the defense (emphasis 
added): 
Salt Lake County voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned 
any defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity by (1) 
abandoning the defense in open court during argument on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) failing to raise the 
issue of governmental immunity in any subsequent argument, motion 
or pleading to the court, and (3) failing to introduce evidence on 
the issue of the discretionary function exception during the trial 
of the case. 
(R. 1456). Having expressly waived any defense based upon governmental 
immunity, Salt Lake County cannot now, on appeal, be heard to argue for 
the application of the discretionary function exception to the waiver 
6
 During a post-trial argument regarding the intent and effect of Mr. McKnighfs verbal waiver of the immunity 
defense, the Trial Court stated its belief that "[i]t seems unequivocal to me that he was relinquishing, knowingly 
relinquishing any right he may have to raise that issue " Mr. Holden, subsequent counsel for Salt Lake County, 
acknowledged the Court's analysis by responding, "I agree that there should have been - [he] probably should not have 
done what he did And prior counsel, he should have probably not done that." (R. 2376-77). 
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doctrine. 
D. Salt Lake County Failed To Introduce Evidence At Trial In 
Support Of A Governmental Immunity Defense. 
Consistent with its open court waiver thereof, Salt Lake County 
failed to introduce any evidence at triaj • <= - • * \-;: y 
function exception. Salt Lake County openly concedes the absence of 
evi dence at 1 t; : i all • : • i: 1 1 i , • • : i i t. i < : a] defense issue.7 Thus, even assuming 
the defense were available, Salt Lake County's failure to introduce 
evidence at trial precludes it from raising the defense on appeal. 
; , ; - i . - A f- . r- < Tosh Kano 
as "evidence" as we] ] as its extensive post-trial argument to the Trial 
Court based solely upon Mr. Kano's inadmissible statements, beg the 
entire issue. . a fact, * ^ meuib uiciw *--.». :-: -: L : ;i-
were obviously available to Salt Lake County during trial, and its 
failure to introduce the same corroborates the Trial Court's finding w*. 
waiver. 
Failure to introduce evidence or argument at the time of trial 
coi icer n :i i lg a u I affirmative defense legally bars the assertion thereof in 
post-trial proceedings.8 Salt Lake County introduced absolutely no 
In its brief, Salt Lake County acknowledges only the post-trial "affidavit of Tosh Kano specified the 
discretionary nature of the act or omission in widening Wasatch Boulevard". Further, Salt Lake County argues that "the 
failure to raise immunity before and during trial" does not constitute a waiver. (Applt. Brief at 38-39). Salt Lake County 
has likewise argued that its "failure to raise the issue at trial" was justified. (Applt. Brief at 38). It is not surprising that 
Salt Lake County did not propose and the Court did not give a jury instruction relating to the discretionary function 
analysis. (R. 967-1033,1079-1134). 
8
 See Turtle Mgt, Inc. v. Haggis Mgt, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah 1982) (where defenses in answer, but no 
argument was made to trial court, Supreme Court "will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial 
court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact or law."); Bangerter 
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal."); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App.1987) (theory not permitted on appeal 
because trial court made no ruling about the issue, appellant made no objection to the omission, and appellant attorney's 
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evidence or argument at trial with respect to a defense based upon the 
discretionary function exception. Applt. Brief at 8-11, 14-16, 39; R. 
967-1033; R. 2388-90, 2398; See also, Findings and Conclusions (R. 
1452-59)• Having failed to preserve this issue, Salt Lake County 
cannot now assert the same on appeal. 
1. The Trial C<?vrt Difl NQt Abuse Its piggr^tipn Xn Striking The 
Untimely. Post-Trial Affidavit Of Tosh Kano. In connection with its 
post-trial decision to belatedly raise the discretionary function 
exception, Salt Lake County realized that it had introduced no evidence 
at trial respecting any immunity defense. To overcome this defect, 
Salt Lake County improperly attempted to submit the post-trial 
affidavit of Tosh Kano. Salt Lake County concedes that Tosh Kano's 
belated affidavit comprises its sole direct evidence of "the 
discretionary nature of the act or omission in widening Wasatch 
Boulevard." (Applt. Brief at 39). As evidenced by the Trial Court's 
Findings & Conclusions, this post-trial submission of evidence was 
properly stricken. (R. 1452-59). 
The affidavit of Tosh Kano was filed May 1, 1995. (R. 1350). 
Despite Salt Lake County's characterization, this affidavit was not 
evidence at all. In addition to being conclusory, self-serving and 
otherwise inadmissible in form, the statements were neither introduced 
as evidence to the jury, nor subject to the cross-examination. The 
mere mention of the term "mortgage" twice in lower proceedings did not raise the issue to a "level of consciousness such 
that the trial judge can consider it."). See also Zions First Afar/7 Bank v. Nat'l American Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,657 
(Utah 1988); LeBaron & Assoc, Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479,482-83 (Utah App. 1991); and Dansie v. 
Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155,1158 n.9 (Utah App. 1994). 
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affidavit has never become part of the trial record, Notably, Salt 
Lake County has not and cannot claim newly discovered evidence. Mr. 
I 'uUIIUi ¥ , < ! i H l t M l t l f l H . i l r i / , »j ( l U . l l l l W l l l i e S J . . ' i . i l l ! i . i k e i i M I 1 V " 1 t .1 1 1 I I I "" I n 
call Mr. Kano supports the ruling of waiver. 
Clearly, Mr. Hart's June 1, 1995 objection to the "after-the-fact" 
affidavi t was timelyc on October i. l"»"i"'l|( (Mi Hail aJju tiled a MoLion 
to Strike Affidavit of Tosh Kano restating that it was irrelevant and 
inadmissible 1528-30) Mi 111.ml .ml Fin stated, 
Salt Lake County's persistence in arguing that its post-trial 
submission of the Affidavit of Tosh Kano (i) is unrebutted, 
and (ii) establishes the basis for this Court's conclusion 
that Salt Lake County's misconduct herein was a discretionary 
function, is incredible. Such evidence is not admissible at 
this late stage of the proceeding and is merely an ill-fated 
attempt to preserve a record for appeal. 
(R. 155 0 . 5aJx Lake County's reference to an untimely objection by 
Mr. Hart mischaracterizes of the record. 
E. The Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Salt Lake County did not waive its 
governmental immunity defenses, an analysis of the
 r ecord shows that 
the discretionary function exception in §#63-30-10(1) does not apply 
because Salt Lake County's negligence is operational, not 
discretionary. 
Decisions of the type sheltered by the ''discretionary function" 
exception are those decisions made at "the basic policy making level." 
Bi ge 1 c i; Ingei sol 1, 618 I 2 el 5 0 , 5 3 (lit al I 1 9 8 0) I" 11 e se tle c i s i o 11 s 
would include, for example, whether to build a highway at a general 
location as opposed to decisions regarding the plans, specifications 
and supervision of the actual construction work. The Bigelow court 
stated: 
Although the acts of the state involved in designing [a] traffic 
control system involve some degree of discretion, as do almost all 
acts, the design of the traffic control system does not involve 
the "basic policy making level." 
Id. Quoted with approval in Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 
1995). Imposing liability upon the state where it "created a dangerous 
condition by the design of [a] highway project," the court in Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added) similarly 
stated: 
The decision to build the highway and specifying its general 
location were discretionary functions, but the preparing of plans 
and specifications and the supervision of the manner in which the 
work was carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions. 
The line between decisions protected by the discretionary function 
exception and decisions not so protected has "been consistently drawn 
between those functions ascribable to the policy making level and those 
to the operational level." Little v. Utah State Div. Of Famiily Serv., 
667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). Once the state attempts to raise its 
immunity shield, "it must make a showing that a conscious balancing of 
risks and advantages took place" with respect to the particular action 
or forbearance in question. Id. (Emphasis added). According to the 
Little court, "[t]o be purely discretionary, an act by the state must 
be affirmed under four preliminary questions:" 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program or 
objective? 
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(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential 
to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program 
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the 
course or direction of the policy, program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise 
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the 
requisite, constitutional, statutory or lawful authority and 
duty to do or to make the challenge to act, omission, or 
decision? 
Id. 
On the record, the Trial Court., uoul.fi noL appjy I he discieLionary 
function exception even if Salt Lake County would have preserved the 
defense, Keega n provided helpful assistance :i n approaching the 
analysis of this issue by indicating that the distinction between 
discretionary and non-discretionary decisions is more on "the basis of 
the execution of already-formulated policies." Id. at 623 
In this case, Jury Instruction No, 3 3 incorporated Utah Code Ann. 
§ •". ' properly stated Salt Lake County's cii ity to c ;: in tpj } • 
with the AASHTO standards of design and construction where it was 
performing ''construction" work on its roadways. (R. 1103-113 0) By 
contrast, and according to the same jury instruction, Salt Lake County 
had no ciiity to comply with AASHTO when performing "maintenance" work, 
i ric] ud :i i lg the making of wany new roadbed either t »y additior ' > existjr 
systems or relocation.7' (R n o Q l nv contrast, the definition of 
"maintenance" work includes the grading or widening of an existing 
yinpfrved road , (R l  II Ill 0) . 
The evidence included the testimony of Bruce Reading, a licensed 
professional engineer, who testified that Wasatch Boulevard, at the 
site of the accident, had been widened by 6 feet prior to the accident. 
(R. 1668-1669). In accord with Jury Instruction No. 31, AASHTO 
guidelines applied to the design and construction of Wasatch Boulevard. 
Mr. Reading further testified Wasatch Boulevard was unsafe, defective 
and non-compliant with AASHTO requirements. (R. 1666, 1671-1673, 
1676). Mr. Reading's opined the negligent and defective condition of 
Wasatch Boulevard contributed to the accident. (R. 1677). 
The statutory decision to comply with AASHTO for all 
"construction" work on highways, constituted a "basic policy-making 
level" decision as to what standards would govern highway construction. 
Salt Lake County's decision to widen Wasatch Blvd. prior to Mr. Hart's 
accident was also discretionary under this test. However, having made 
that decision, Salt Lake County's actions in performing construction 
work (i.e., the method of construction design, etc.) included 
operational decision making in compliance with objective, easily 
understood, AASHTO standards. In this regard, Salt Lake County's 
activities are very similar to the design of the traffic control system 
in Bigelow. 
Keegan makes it clear that the governmental entity seeking the 
protection of discretionary function immunity carries the burden of 
evidencing it was engaged in basic policy making decisions, and that 
the suit for negligence attacks those discretionary activities. Id. at 
624. The Little court reached the same conclusion in requiring "a 
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showing that a conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place." 
Little, 667 P.2d at 51. In this case, there was absolutely no evidence 
offered to prove such a conscious balancing occurred. Salt Lake County 
failed to carry its burden. 
By contrast, in Keegan, the state introduced testimony from the 
UDOT safety studies engineer (Art Guerts) and the specific project 
design engineer (Alex Badaliam) who provided testimonial and 
documentary evidence of the complicated and numerous basic policy 
decisions and processes that were involved. The studies were extensive 
and the decision to proceed in the construction project was made at a 
policy level. In this case, Salt Lake County failed to introduce any 
evidence of the decision making process. Notably, Tosh Kano, who 
produced the post-trial affidavit now relied upon by Salt Lake County, 
did not testify. 
This record cannot demonstrate any attempt by Salt Lake County to 
carry its burden of proving that the discretionary function exception 
is applicable under these circumstances. The jury was correct in 
finding that Salt Lake County was negligent in its design, construction 
and maintenance of Wasatch Blvd. and that such negligence caused Mr. 
Hart's injuries. 
P. Keegan v. State Of Utah Did Not Change The Law Of 
Governmental Immunity In The State Of Utah And Does Not 
Provide Grounds For Relief From Judgment. 
Citing Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7), and claiming Keegan is 
dispositive, Salt Lake County seeks relief from the verdict. While 
acknowledging that the Utah Supreme Court had not addressed the 
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question,9 Salt Lake County contends any "change in law" justifies 
vacating the judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) based upon its interpretation 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), an analogous federal rule.10 First, 
Keegan does not represent a change in the law. Second, even if it did, 
careful review of the authorities cited demonstrates that a simple 
change in law is not a sufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
1. jEeegai? Refrffjnngfl anfl Clfrrified Prior PsQipipnal fr^w in Utfrht 
Salt Lake County's argument that it should be relieved from judgment 
focuses on what it perceives to be a change in the law created by 
Keegan. This argument exposes Salt Lake County's misunderstanding of 
Keegan. 
A review of Keegan and prior case law shows the error of Salt Lake 
County's position. This question involves the interplay between Utah 
Code Ann. §#63-30-8 and §#63-30-10(1) and the applicability of 
discretionary function exception set forth in §#8 prior to the 1991 
amendment to that section. See Mr. Hart's argument, supra, at 9, n. 1. 
The first analysis of this question is found in Velasquez v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970). In Velasguez, the court 
held that the discretionary function exception found in §#10(1) applied 
to negligence cases arising under a §8 waiver of immunity. After 
applying a discretionary function analysis, the court held "the State 
of Utah is excepted from the waiver of immunity from suit ..." Id at 6. 
A year later, the Supreme Court reviewed a nuisance case which 
9
 See Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 252 P.2d 205,207 (Utah 1953). 
10
 The federal counterpart to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) is Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
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also alleged that immunity had been waived under §#63-30-8. In Sanford 
v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971), the court held that 
the discretionary function exception of §#10(1) did not apply to a 
nuisance action alleging waiver under §#8. Id. at 745. Although 
Sanford is clearly distinguishable from the holding in Velasquez, it 
did give rise to some confusion in subsequent opinions construing §#8 
and §#10. See Bigelow, 618 P.2d at 53 and Richards v. Leavitt, 716 
P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1986). 
Despite the apparent confusion in Bigelow and Leavitt, the 
Velasquez holding has never been overruled or eroded. Of particular 
significance to Salt Lake County's position is Duncan v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). That Salt Lake County 
completely ignored Duncan in its argument is understandable given 
Duncan's clear reaffirmation of Velasquez. After analyzing the 
plaintiff's contention that Velasquez should be overruled as a result 
of subsequent opinions, the Duncan court held: 
We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the duties imposed upon 
UDOT in these particulars are truly discretionary functions and 
are therefore protected by governmental immunity. 
Our decisions in Bigelow v. Ingersoll . . . , Bower v. Riverton 
City . . . , and Richards v. Leavitt . . ., have not eroded our 
holding in Velasquez. 
Id. at 835. 
Therefore, even if same confusion had existed previously, the 
state of decisional law in Utah was clear in April, 1992 under Duncan. 
Velasquez was still the law and §#63-30-8 was subject to the 
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discretionary function exception set forth in §#63-30-10(1). The fact 
that Duncan was decided more than two years prior to the trial in this 
action is fatal to Salt Lake County's position. 
Moreover, the opinion in Keegan leaves no room for argument. The 
Supreme Court did not consider Keegan to be a change in the law. To 
the contrary, in reviewing prior case law, the Keegan court 
specifically references Duncan and concluded: 
In summary, we note that Velasquez was this court's earliest 
statement on the application of §63-30-10 to §63-30-8, and it has 
never been definitively overruled or limited. Velasquez is also 
the most recently reaffirmed approach by this court. See id. 
Furthermore, the Velasquez rule not only comports with our prior 
case law, but makes sound decisional genge ag well-
Id. at 623 (emphasis added) . A reading of Keegan permits only one 
conclusion: it did not change prior law; it affirmed it. 
Even if Keegan represented a change in law, that it fail as a 
basis for Salt Lake County's Rule 60(b) motion, federal courts 
addressing the issue recognize the general rule that a mere "change in 
law" is not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) may be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances", and a 
change in law alone is not an extraordinary circumstance. Salt Lake 
County has misstated the law on this issue, has failed to discuss the 
"extraordinary circumstances" test under Rule 60(b) (6)11, and has 
Notably, Salt Lake County omits any reference to authority establishing this rule. In observing the foregoing 
general rule, Wright & Miller refers to the case of Louche v United States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (emphasis 
added), which held: "[0]nly where the total record portrays extraordinary circumstances ... may a party who failed to 
appear or appeal resort to the extreme remedy afforded by Rule 60(b)(6).... But this rule was not... intended to invest the 
court with an omnipotence whose boundary is defined only by the court's conscience.... [T]he courts have enunciated the 
dual proposition that Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute for appeal and that resort to the rule in order to obtain relief from a 
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omitted any mention of the leading cases establishing the Tenth Circuit 
law on whether a change of law is basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
The leading Tenth Circuit case is Pierce v. Cook & Co., Inc., 518 
F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975). In Pierce, one plaintiff was injured when 
hit by a shipper's truck. The driver's claim was removed to federal 
court, where the driver's claims were dismissed under an Oklahoma state 
court decision that relieved the shipper of liability for the acts of 
independent contractors. The second plaintiff, a passenger, also sued 
the shipper, but avoided removal. The passenger succeeded in having 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court overrule the decision under which the driver 
lost her suit, an option unavailable to the driver herself. The driver 
filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the judgment due to the change 
in law. Noting that "[a]n adjudication must at some time become 
final," the Tenth Circuit stated the general rule that relief from 
judgments under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in "extraordinary 
situations," and "'a change in the law or in the judicial view of an 
established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance which 
justifies such relief.1" Id. at 723 (quoting Collins v. City of 
Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958) (denying Rule 60(b)(6) 
motion)). The Pierce court distinguished Pierce from Collins and 
concluded extraordinary circumstances existed.12 
judgment is not justified merely because the judgment is erroneous or because the decisional law has been changed bv a 
subsequent ruling." C. Wright & A. Miller\ Federal Practice and Procedure, §2864 (Supp. 1994). 
In Collins, the change in law occurred in a wholly unrelated case and the Tenth Circuit held that a mere 
change in law was not extraordinary enough to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). In contrast, the change in law in Pierce 
"aros[e] out of the same accident as that in which the plaintiffs now before us were injured." Additionally, the driver 
would not have been able to obtain the reversal of the Oklahoma decision in federal court. The Tenth Circuit held: 
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Although the Tenth Circuit granted relief due to a change in law 
under Rule 60(b)(6) in Pierce, Salt Lake County's decision not to cite 
Pierce is understandable. Pierce demonstrates that Salt Lake County's 
stated basis for relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) is anything but 
"extraordinary." Compared to the unusual facts in Pierce, Salt Lake 
County's basis for relief is premised upon a simple change of law in a 
wholly unrelated action. Salt Lake County does not cite Pierce because 
its request for relief does not survive the comparison. 
Salt Lake County relies on Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith N.C., 39 F.3d 1482, 1491 n.9 (10th Cir. 1994). While Metz 
acknowledges that a Supreme Court decision may warrant Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief, no Supreme Court decision is implicated in this case. Salt 
Lake County's statement that the Tenth Circuit recognizes such 
decisions as warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief is both irrelevant and 
incorrect. This is particularly evident when the entire text of 
footnote 9 to the Metz opinion is reviewed. 
Unlike each case cited, Salt Lake County neither asserted the 
subsequently changed law (i.e., governmental immunity defense), nor 
obtained a determination under the prior state law. The issue of 
governmental immunity was never decided by the Trial Court; rather, 
The unusual combination of events which have occurred make the situation extraordinary. The federal 
courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than 
that received in state court by another injured in the same accident. 
Id. Obviously, the situation in the present case is much more similar to Collins than to Pierce. However, as noted above, 
Keegan, did not change Utah law. 
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Salt Lake County simply abandoned the defense. Moreover, Keegan does 
not change the law, and arises in a wholly unrelated case, after the 
law of this action was determined and a verdict rendered. Even if 
Keegan is thought to make a change in law by clarification, it does not 
rise to the standard required to support the relief requested by Salt 
Lake County.13 
II. SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED A DUTY OF CARE TO MR. HART TO DESIGN, 
CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN WASATCH BOULEVARD IN A SAFE CONDITION, FREE 
FROM DANGEROUS DEFECTS OR HAZARDS. 
Utah law has long-recognized that governmental entities owe a duty 
of reasonable care to the motoring public regarding the maintenance and 
operation of their various highway systems. "Generally, a municipality 
has *a non-delegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets 
within its corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel . . . . ' " De Villiers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161, 1166-67 
(Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).14 As a governmental entity, 
Salt Lake County owed a duty of reasonable care to Mr. Hart in its 
design, construction, maintenance and operation of Wasatch Boulevard. 
Unlike the facts in Keegan, Salt Lake County failed to present any evidence regarding the factual 
underpinnings of an immunity defense. No testimony whatsoever was introduced regarding accident/safety studies, 
County analyses of safety and budgetary concerns, delays or inconvenience or other planning considerations. Indeed, the 
"after-the-fact" Affidavit of Tosh Kano begs the entire question. 
uSee Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm w, 465 P.2d 534, 536 n.3 (Utah 1970) (acknowledged state's "duty to 
exercise reasonable care in keeping highways in a safe condition for travel."); Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896, 897 
(Utah 1976) (charged city "with a non-delegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets and sidewalks . . . in 
reasonably safe condition for travel") and Carroll v. State Road Comm w., 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972) (acknowledged 
state's duty to provide reasonably adequate means of advising or protecting the public regarding dangerous conditions) 
and cases cited. Authorities similarly recognize that "[o]ne who undertakes . . . to render services to another... is subject 
to liability to the other f o r . . . his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 323 (1979). 
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It is curious that Salt Lake County now argues it had no duty. In a 
post-trial memorandum, Salt Lake County admitted it "had a duty to 
exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel." (R. 1270). Consistent with the jury 
instructions proposed by Salt Lake County and given by the Trial Court, 
this duty includes (i) w[compliance] with the design and construction 
standards currently adopted by the AASHTO" (R. 1027, 1109-10); and (ii) 
the "exercise [of] due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in a 
reasonably safe condition for travel" (R. 1028, 1108). The Trial 
Court's instructions also included duty to use reasonable care "to 
design safe highways and maintain its highways in a reasonably safe 
condition. (R. 1102, 1107).15 In its closing argument, Salt Lake 
County even noted, "[t]he duty owed by [Salt Lake County] to the 
plaintiff is a duty to exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch 
Boulevard in a reasonably safe condition for traffic." (R. 2341) . 
Salt Lake County's reference to the public duty doctrine on appeal 
is misplaced. First, Salt Lake County failed to plead or adequately 
address this defense at trial. Until well after the close of evidence. 
Salt Lake County did not assert the affirmative defense in its Answer 
(R. 102-10) and did not raise it during trial. Salt Lake County even 
In Instruction No. 23, the Trial Court advised the jury of Mr. Hart's claims of negligence and instructed that 
"[t]o return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find . . . [t]he defendant was negligent in one or more of the [five] 
particulars alleged " (R. 1101). In light of the verdict, Salt Lake County 's self serving and limited characterization 
of the jury's finding of liability clearly ignores the record. In its brief, Salt Lake County notes that it objected to 
Instruction No. 23 on the basis of lack of evidence. This objection was overruled by the Trial Court presumably in light 
of the unrebutted testimony of, inter alia, Bruce Reading (R. 1677-78,1695) and Mr. Hart (R. 1809-14,1890-91,1894-
95,2279-80). Salt Lake County's post trial assertion of the public duty doctrine is irrelevant. 
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proposed duty instructions at odds with its argument on appeal,16 
Second, and more importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled the 
public duty doctrine does not apply under the these circumstances. In 
Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment and held that a municipality 
owes an injured person a duty to maintain a sidewalk in a reasonably 
safe condition despite the absence of a "special relationship." The 
Trapp court stated: 
[These] special relationship cases . . . have no application 
to the present case . . . . In the special relationship cases, 
people, not physical facilities, are the things that must be 
"controlled" if a duty exists. . . The present case does not 
involve the duty to control an independent actor; rather, it 
involves a duty to maintain physical facilities. 
The duty to maintain physical facilities, or more 
specifically, to keep sidewalks and streets in a reasonably safe 
condition, was first enunciated in Scott v. Provo City, 14 Utah 
31, 45 P.1005 (1895), and was most recently endorsed in Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). (citations omitted). 
For almost a century, Utah statutes have implicitly recognized 
this duty by conferring on persons who have been injured or 
damaged from a defective sidewalk the right to present a claim to 
the city or town, (citations omitted). This duty seems generally 
grounded upon the common law principal that one who has control 
over a physical facility has an obligation to keep it in safe 
condition (citations omitted). 
16
 Salt Lake County's request that the plain error exception be applied should be disregarded. In State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), the court reviewed the doctrine of "plain error", stating, "[t]he first 
requirement... is that the error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should 
have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error The second . . . requirement... is that the error affect 
the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Id. at 922, (citation omitted). Despite its burden, Salt 
Lake County has made no showing of either obvious error or that a substantial right has been adversely affected. Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,301 (Utah 1982). Salt Lake County's duty is the subject of settled case 
law and was specifically acknowledged by Salt Lake County in the jury instructions it submitted or approved. No plain 
error occurred. 
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Id at 161-62 (emphases added) .17 
Salt Lake County's attempt to distinguish Trapp based upon Salt 
Lake County's selective reference to a "redesign" is nonsensicle. Mr. 
Hart's claim was not limited to negligence in failing to redesign. At 
trial, Mr. Hart established that Salt Lake County was negligent as a 
result of its failure to design, construct and maintain Wasatch 
Boulevard in a safe condition, including its failure to provide an 
adequate shoulder. (R. 1139-40). Moreover, Salt Lake County's 
suggestion that it was unable to foresee and manage risk associated 
with a defective highway is contrary to the evidence. Unrebutted 
evidence established Salt Lake County's awareness of numerous accidents 
on Wasatch Boulevard (R. 1918-21, 1939) and of its construction project 
prior to the accident to widen the highway. (R. 1667-68). Bruce 
Reading testified it was fundamental in the highway design process to 
anticipate potential obstacles and dangerous conditions in the road and 
to construct an adequate escape route to allow motorists to avoid the 
same. (R. 1678-79). He also testified that the standards of AASHTO 
applied to Wasatch Boulevard. (R. 1653). The Trial Court committed no 
error in concluding Salt Lake County owed Mr. Hart the referenced duty 
of care. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING SALT 
LAKE COUNTY'S UNTIMELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOR, INTER ALIA, 
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(c). 
On February 1, 1995, Salt Lake County moved, pursuant to Rule 
17
 Caselaw cited by Salt Lake County in support of its application of the public duty doctrine are clearly 
distinguishable as they involve a municipality's control of people, not physical facilities such as sidewalks, streets, 
highways and related structures. 
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59(a) (1), for a new trial. Salt Lake County argued the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in (i) permitting Mr. Hart's counsel to summarize 
evidence of medical expenses and to generally refer to the fact and 
nature of Mr. Hart's settlement with co-defendant Tweedy, and (ii) in 
failing to instruct the jury on the comparative fault of Mr. Hart, 
despite the admitted absence of any direct evidence of neglect on his 
part. 
On February 16, 1995, Mr. Hart objected to the motion given Salt 
Lake County's failure to comply with Rule 59(c). Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c) 
mandates (emphasis added): 
When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1) . . . , it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. . . . The time within which the 
affidavits . . . shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. . . . 
As properly determined by the Trial Court, Salt Lake County failed to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 59(c). (R.#1456). No affidavit 
was served or filed in support of Salt Lake County's Rule 59(a)(1) 
request and a Rule 59(c) extension was not obtained. 
In Thorley v. Kolob Fish And Game Club, 373 P.2d 574, 576 (Utah 
1962) (emphasis added), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a denial of a 
Rule 59(a) (1) motion stating, ,f[t]he motion was properly denied by the 
lower court because the appellants did not comply with Rule 59(c) in 
filing the affidavit timely." (Emphasis added). See also Burgess v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit Union v. 
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Moeller, 656 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah 1982). 
Since Salt Lake County failed to submit the required evidentiary 
support for its Rule 59(a)(1) challenge, the Trial Court properly 
determined Salt Lake County's after-the-fact submission of evidence was 
invalid.18 Given Salt Lake Countyfs noncompliance, Salt Lake Countyfs 
its argument was not preserved on appeal. Finally, Salt Lake County's 
self-serving attempt, to now recharacterize its R59(a)(1) motion as a 
UR59(7)" [sic] motion should be disregarded. 
K. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Permitting 
Counsel To Generally Summarize Mr. Hart's Medical Expenses 
And The General Nature Of Co-Defendants' Settlement. 
Even assuming, the Trial Court improperly denied Salt Lake 
County's motion, no abuse of discretion can be shown. Utah courts 
recognize that * [a] trial court's decisions regarding admission of 
evidence are generally accorded a good deal of discretion . . . ." 
Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 
App. 1994). u[W]e review a trial court's determination that evidence is 
not unfairly prejudicial under an abuse of discretion standard and 
'reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of reasonability.'" 
Olympus Hills Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 
P.2d 445, 455 (Utah App. 1994). 
Salt Lake County contends that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion by permitting Mr. Hart's counsel during uclosing" argument 
Even if its Rule 59(a)(1) argument were properly before the Court, Salt Lake County nevertheless failed to 
marshal the evidence. No direct or substantial evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Hart was comparatively negligent 
and reference to Mr. Hart's settlement with Tweedy was made only after consultation with, and express approval by, Judge 
Medley both in chambers and in court. 
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to reference expenses, Mr. Hart's settlement with co-defendant 
Tweedy.19 Salt Lake County's argument ignores the Trial Court' specific 
instructions. Following Mr. Hart's closing argument, Salt Lake County 
objected. (R. 2335-38). In response, Mr. Schmutz noted his strict 
compliance and stated: 
I understood completely the issue that the court framed at the 
beginning of the trial . . . that the amount of the damages could 
not be discussed, but that beyond a specific discussion of the 
amounts, there could be some reference made to the general range 
or significance of the settlement . . . . 
(R. 2336). The Trial Court ruled, "Mr. Schmutz's closing argument on 
that point was consistent with the evidence that was received . . . and 
the court is not satisfied that the defendant is prejudiced by [his 
argument]". (R. 2337). 
Salt Lake County's argument also disregards its own argument of 
Mr. Hart's bias due to the Tweedy settlement. During his opening 
statement, Mr. Stone argued: "[The Tweedys] have been released out of 
this lawsuit because they have reached a financial settlement. Mr. 
Hart now has a financial interest and his sole motive in this case is 
to blame this accident not on Tweedy but upon Salt Lake County." (R. 
1612). This is like the pot calling the kettle black -- Salt Lake 
County suggests Mr. Schmutz' summation inferred only nominal damages 
were recovered from Mr. Tweedy(i.e., implying the jury should award 
more than it might otherwise), yet in its opening argument, Salt Lake 
County inferred that Mr. Hart was amply rewarded in the settlement and 
19
 Salt Lake County's reliance on King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988) is misplaced. Unlike the facts in 
King, Mr. Schmutz' reference to medical evidence and settlement occurred during summation, not in the case in chief. 
The reference was, accordingly, not evidence and fell clearly within the Trial Court's Jury Instruction No. 10. 
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seeks a double recovery (i.e., implying the jury should not award 
damages or less than it might otherwise). In light of the jury 
instructions given regarding statements of counsel not being evidence 
(R. 1088), the counterbalancing effect of these arguments, and the 
attendant fairness in our system of advocacy, no harm can be said to 
have occurred, as found by the Trial Court. (R. 2337) . 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Refusing To 
Submit The Issue of Mr. Hart#s Comparative Fault To The Jury 
And Salt Lake County Agreed To The Submission Of Mr. Hart's 
Special Verdict Form. 
Salt Lake County argues the Trial Court's failure to submit its 
proposed special verdict form is reversible error. However, Salt Lake 
County ignores its in camera pretrial acquiescence, that no substantial 
evidence existed to warrant including Mr. Hart on the verdict, and 
disregards the absence of facts in the record.20 Moreover, despite 
Salt Lake County's selective citation to the record, including the 
Trial Court's conclusions regarding evidence at trial substantiates the 
exclusion of Mr. Hart from the special verdict form. 
Based upon a misleading citation to the record (R. 2371), Salt 
Lake County suggests the Trial Court concurred with Mr. Postma's 
recollection of an in camera pretrial conference dialogue concerning 
jury instructions and the special verdict form. Nothing could be 
further from the truth! As the record reveals, Judge Medley was 
actually being sarcastic with Mr. Postma for his "crystal clear 
Notably, Salt Lake County's pretrial conference stipulation that Mr. Hart need not be included on the verdict 
form consistent with its defense strategy. This Court will recall that on summary judgment and attest, Salt Lake County 
contended Tweedy was the sole cause of the accident. {See Applt. Brief at 5). 
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[memory] at this point" of the in camera discussion. (R. 2371) .21 In 
subsequent discussion between Mr. Schmutz and the Trial Court (R. 2384-
86), Mr. Postma's stated recall was again found to be inaccurate 
(emphasis added): 
[Mr. Schmutz'] recitation of that event is more consistent with 
this court' recollection and I am just going to be honest and up 
front. I guess I wag a little put frgifle by, as I indicated 
earlier, foyl Mrf Postma's apparent crystal clear recollection of 
something different. I just could not recall Salt Lake County 
asserting their position that they thought the plaintiff should be 
on the verdict form for comparative negligence purposes. I 
thought it was almost acquiescence that there was no negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff, consequently when I started seeing 
these post trial motions come in, I was really surprised. 
(R. 2386) . 
Mindful that u[s]ubmitting the issue of contributory negligence to 
a jury when there is no reasonable evidence in the record to support 
this defense is reversible error and grounds for a new trial," the 
Trial Court evidence, considered the in camera concession of counsel 
and exercised its discretion in adopting a verdict form, which excluded 
Mr. Hart. See Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 
1988).22 The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. 
IV. THE DAMAGES CAP STATUTE VIOLATES MR. HART'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
BY LIMITING HIS RECOVERY $250,000. 
Following a four-day jury trial, a $1.3 million verdict was 
21
 Even during this exchange, the Trial Court observed, "I am not sure Mr. Postma's recitation is accurate at this 
point, but I do know for sure that I did not include the plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form because I didn't think that 
there was evidence establishing . . . that the plaintiff was negligent." (R. 2371). In direct response to this statement, Salt 
Lake County's counsel conceded, 'there wasn't direct testimony" of Mr. Hart's comparative fault. (R. 2371). 
22
 It must be noted that Salt Lake County voiced no objection during trial to the Trial Court's decision to submit 
the special verdict form or to not submit any jury instruction on comparative fault. 
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rendered in favor of Mr. Hart. The jury concluded Mr. Hart was 
entitled to recover $678,000 (51% x $1,330,000) in damages, 
exclusive of interest, from Salt Lake County. Notwithstanding 
the jury's considered verdict, the Trial Court applied §#63-30-
34 ("Damages Cap Statute'') to limit Mr. Hartf s damages. 
The Damages Cap Statute provides, in pertinent part: 
(1)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment 
for damages for personal injury against a governmental 
entity, . . . exceeds $250,000 for one person in any one 
occurrence, . . . the court shall reduce the judgment to 
that amount. 
§63-30-34(1) (a). In limiting the amount of recovery available 
to persons injured by reason of government misconduct to 
$250,000, the Damages Cap Statute arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily restricts the rights of seriously injured 
persons, such as Mr. Hart. The Utah Constitution guarantees Mr. 
Hart's basic and important rights to recover for personal 
injuries, to be treated equally under the law, to enjoy life, 
and to seek full redress for his injuries in the Utah State 
courts. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356 and cases cited 
therein.23 
Even assuming a rational-basis standard of review, which 
Mr. Hart believes is too lenient given the "fundamental" or 
23See also Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,669 (Utah 1984) (Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
ensures that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly") and cases cited therein. 
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"important substantive" nature of his rights,24 the 
discriminatory classification inherent in the Damages Cap 
Statute neither is reasonable in light of any conceivable 
legislative purpose (see also discussion, infra, Botts v. 
DeLand), nor does it bear a rational relationship to the 
achievement of such a purpose. This Court should declare the 
Damages Cap Statute unconstitutional. 
A. If Applied, The Damages Cap Statute Would Violate The 
Open Courts Clause of The Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
" [a]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury due 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law." The Open Courts clause is primarily 
concerned not with the preservation of particular, identifiable 
causes of action as such; rather, it focuses on the availability 
of legal remedies for those injured in their persons, property, 
and reputations. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 
24The Condemarin Court defined a "fundamental" right as follows: 
If the substantive right is deemed to be "fundamental," statutory restrictions will be 
examined very closely under the strict scrutiny test; only the presence of a 
compelling state interest will justify the restriction or denial of access to the courts. 
If, on the other hand, the substantive right being asserted is not the subject of a 
specific constitutional protection and is therefore not fundamental, then the rational 
basis test provides that access to the courts may be restricted if a rational or 
reasonable basis for the restriction is shown. 
775 P.2d at 358 (emphasis added) (quoting Note, "Constitutional Law: Statutorily Required Mediation as a 
Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 316,319-20 (1980)). Although failing to 
attribute "fundamental right" status to the Section 11 Open Courts analysis in the case, which arguably ignored its 
own definition, the Court did acknowledge the "important substantive" nature of such rights in applying an 
intermediate standard of review. Id. at 354 and 358. See also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359; Trujillo v. City of 
Albuquerque, 798 P.2d 571, 577-78 (N.M. 1990) (op. w'drwn reh'g rem'd, 893 P.2d 1006 (N.M. 1995)) (right to 
remedy for injuries was fundamental). 
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670, 677 n.4 (Utah 1985)"(Section 11 protects remedies by due 
course of law for injuries done to the substantive interests of 
person, property, and reputation"). 
Berry established a two-part test to be applied to 
legislation that limits the availability of remedies: 
(1) Does the law provide "an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy fby due course of law1" for the 
restricted remedy imposed, and if not, 
(2) Is the restrictive nature of the law justified by a 
"clear social or economic" purpose and is the restriction 
not an "arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective"? 
Id. at 680. The Utah Supreme Court has openly acknowledged that 
"the right to be [compensated] for personal injuries" is an 
"important substantive right" which is "in many cases 
fundamental to the injured person1s physical well-being and 
ability to continue to live a decent life." Condemarin, 775 
P.2d at 360 (citations omitted). The Damages Cap Statute fails 
to satisfy the Berry test to the extent he falls within the 
class of persons injured by a government tort-feasor and to the 
extent his injuries exceed the statutory limit imposed such cap. 
The injustice of placing the entire burden of protecting 
the public treasury on a few individuals who suffer serious 
injuries as a result of governmental negligence has generated 
strong and well-reasoned opinions. The Condemarin court stated: 
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Millions of healthcare consumers stand to gain from 
whatever savings the limit produces. Yet, the entire 
burden of paying for this benefit is concentrated on a 
handful of badly injured victims--fewer than 15 in the year 
MICRA was enacted. Although the Legislature normally 
enjoys wide latitude in distributing the burdens of 
personal injuries, the singling out of such a minuscule and 
vulnerable group violates even the most undemanding 
standard of under inclusiveness. 
775 P.2d at 355 (quoting Fein v. Pejrmanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 
665, 691-92 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted)). See also 
discussion, infra re: Botts v. DeLand. While reviewing the 
Damages Cap Statute under an analogous equal protection 
theory,25 Justice Stewart aptly observed: 
The discriminatory classification imposed by the damages 
cap unreasonably produces harsh results with respect to a 
few people. That consequence of the statute is the 
antithesis of equal protection of the law. 
McCorvey v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 49 (Utah 
1993) (Stewart J., dissenting). Safeguarding the public 
treasury cannot justify an erosion of Mr. Hartfs fundamental or 
"important substantive" right absent a showing at minimum that 
the legislative measure is reasonable and necessary. 
B. The Damages Cap Statute, On Its Face And As Applied By 
Salt Lake County, Would Violate Constitutional Due 
Process. 
Since the Open Courts clause is "an extension of the due 
process clause," Berry, 111 P.2d at 679, a substantive due 
The natural overlap between Sections 11 (Open Courts), Section 7 (Due Process) and Section 24 (Equal 
Protection) has been observed by the Utah Supreme Court. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356-58. 
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process analysis is often utilized in evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislation that impairs a party's right to 
a complete remedy for personal injuries. In Condemarin, for 
example, Justices Durham and Zimmerman equated the two-part 
Berry test under the Open Courts clause as the appropriate due 
process analysis where a remedy, that otherwise would be 
available, is restricted by legislation. See Condemarin, 775 
P.2d at 357. 
In this case, as recognized in Condemarin: 
the legislature has determined that the cost of protecting 
the public treasury shall be borne by those few persons 
most seriously injured by the negligence of government 
. . . . [Having waived immunity], the legislature set out 
to accord the victims of governmental tort-feasors the same 
status as victims of private tort-feasors. 
Id. at 361 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Damages Cap Statute 
"severely restricts the right of every citizen to recover even 
actual out-of-pocket losses [and] substantially infringes upon 
those interests specifically protected by article 1, section 
11." Id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). 
Mr. Hart's constitutional right to due process does not 
permit such a result. The legislation fails to satisfy any 
applicable standard of review. Thus, this Court should also 
strike the Damages Cap Statute down as unconstitutional under 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. The Damages Cap Statute, On Its Face And As Applied By 
Salt Lake County, Violates Constitutional Equal 
Protection. 
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The Damages Cap Statute unreasonably operates in a 
discriminatory fashion since it applies only to persons injured 
by governmental entities £nd, as to those injured by 
governmental entities, the statute discriminates between those 
whose damages exceed $250,000 and those who suffer fewer 
damages. See McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 48-50 (Stewart, J., 
concurring and dissenting). While Mr. Hart believes heightened 
scrutiny applies, even assuming a rational basis review, such 
classifications can be upheld only if (1) they are reasonable, 
(2) they have "more than a speculative tendency to further the 
legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially 
further [] a valid legislative purpose," and (3) they are 
reasonably necessary "to further a legitimate legislative goal." 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583 (Utah 1993). Here, even 
assuming a rational-basis review, there is no legitimate or 
rational purpose for the discriminatory legislation. Even if 
there were such a purpose, the Damages Cap Statute does not 
rationally and reasonably advance any legitimate purpose. 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
applicable whenever the state chooses to act. Thus, 
whenever a state chooses to waive its sovereign immunity, 
it must do so in a manner that does not irrationally 
discriminate between classes of its citizens. 
Greyhound Food Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1207, 
1215 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd rem'd, 852 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis added) (statute precluding government claims by 
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subrogated claimholders denied equal protection) aff'd on other 
grounds. 852 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1988).26 The classification 
between claimants with damages over $250,000 and those with 
damages under $250,000 does not itself relate to the goal of 
preserving public resources. See id. at 1214. Justice Stewart 
appropriately observed: 
Although the State clearly has the right, and even a duty, 
to protect itself [and the state treasury] from such 
liabilities [that might threaten the delivery of government 
services], and although the damages cap is designed to 
further that goal, it does so in such a marginal way as to 
be unreasonable. Certainly one can kill a gnat with a 
sledgehammer, but that does not make a sledgehammer a 
reasonable means of killing gnats. The state has many 
other reasonable ways to protect the treasury from an 
unduly burdensome drain on it. The discriminatory 
classification imposed by the damages cap unreasonably 
produces harsh results with respect to a few people. That 
consequence of the statute is the antithesis of equal 
protection of the law. 
McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 49 (Stewart, J., concurring and 
dissenting) ,27 
26The equal protection analysis is not changed by the fact that there was no right to recover damages for injury 
from the government until the state waived its immunity. It is the character of the right granted, as well as the manner in 
which it is extended, not the date or grantor thereof, that gives rise to heightened scrutiny. 
27Justice Stewart continued, "the Legislature cannot grant [the privilege or right to sue the state] on any 
condition that it wishes to impose If the Legislature may impose any condition it chooses on a •privilege' that it may 
grant or deny, such as business licenses, leases of state land, etc., then it could allow men to recover full damages from the 
state for injuries arising out of negligent maintenance of the public highways, but allow women to recover only part of the 
damages they suffer. The Legislature could also grant residents of only some counties the right to a full recovery and 
deny that right to residents of other counties; and it could discriminate in granting a right to damages for injuries 
negligently caused by the state on the basis of a plaintiffs age, ancestry, or employment." Id. 
"The damages cap in this case invidiously discriminates against a few individuals who suffer devastating 
injuries. The proposition that the state's ability to finance necessary or important functions would be jeopardized by 
allowing full recovery does not justify the discrimination. The state has a number of other means for protecting the 
treasury that do not require a few seriously injured persons to bear that entire financial burden." Id. at 50. 
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Justice Stewartf s argument may have been the dissenting 
opinion in McCorvey, but, it now constitutes the unanimous 
opinion of the Supreme Court as set forth in the recent case of 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). In Bott, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the essence of Justice Stewart's 
reasoning, noting the absence of evidence that the statute's 
purpose will be frustrated and the state's coffers will be 
depleted by "making full retribution to the few prisoners who 
will succeed in showing that prison employees acted with 
1
 deliberate indifference1 or 'unnecessary abuse1 . . . ." Id. 
at 739. 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the County's treasury 
will be depleted by allowing a few motorists who have been 
seriously injured by Salt Lake County's negligence to be fully 
reimbursed for their damages; therefore, the Damages Cap Statute 
should not be applied. 
D. If Applied, The Damages Cap Statute Would Violate Mr. 
Hart's Inherent And Inalienable Constitutional Right 
to Enjoy His Life. 
The Utah Constitution states that " [a]11 men have the 
inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives 
and liberties". Utah Const. Art. I, § 1. The Damages Cap 
Statute infringes this fundamental right. 
In Bott, 922 P.2d 732 and Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1129 
(Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court addressed constitutional 
issues in relation to personal injuries suffered by two inmates. 
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In Bott, an inmate suffered injury stemming from negligent 
medical treatment. The inmate sued the government doctor and 
medical technician that treated him and was awarded $4 90,000 in 
damages. The Trial Court reduced the recovery to $250,000. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed and held the Damages Cap Statute was 
unconstitutional. Bott, at 739-40. 
The unnecessary rigor clause of Art. I, §9 provides that 
11
 [p] ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." While Mr. Hart cannot claim that he was 
treated with unnecessary rigor, the essence of both the 
unnecessary rigor clause and the right to enjoy life under Art. 
I, § 1 are the same: They both guarantee a fundamental right to 
enjoy one's life free of unnecessary abuse or injury. See, id. 
at 734. 
Bott recognized that a prison inmate is entitled to full 
compensation for unnecessary abuse while in prison. Mr. Hart 
asserts that the same essential right should be accorded to non 
prisoners pursuant to Art. I, §1. Mr. Hart's constitutional 
right to enjoy his life is violated by the Damages Cap Statute. 
It would, indeed, be ironic if a prison inmate has a 
constitutional right for compensation to remedy abuse to his 
life and that a non inmate could not have a corresponding 
constitutional right intended to preserve essentially the same 
fundamental right. 
This conclusion is especially compelling in light of the 
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fact that the perceived objective of the Damages Cap Statute 
(protecting the public treasury from unreasonable depletion) 
would not be frustrated by declaring the Damages Cap Statute an 
impermissible infringement of Mr. Hart's Art. I, §1 rights. The 
analysis in Bott applies: 
"Our research reveals no sound evidence that making full 
retribution to the few prisoners [or the few persons 
seriously injured by Salt Lake County's negligence] who 
will succeed in showing that prison employees [or County 
employees] acted with *deliberate indifference' or 
xunnecessarily abuse', [or negligence in the present case] 
. . . will deplete the state [or County] coffers. . . . 
Imposing a statutory cap on damages is a crippling 
regulation of prisoners' [or nonprisoners'] right to 
recover under Article I, Section 9 [or Article I, Section 
1], [citation omitted], and in light of the weakness of the 
statutory objective of subsections 63-30-34 (1)(a) and (b), 
we conclude that these subsections constitute an 
unreasonable regulation of Bott's Article I, Section 9 [or 
Hart's Article I, Section 1] rights." 
Bott, at 739. 
The Damages Cap Statute should be declared 
unconstitutional. 
E. The Damages Cap Statute Violates Mr. Hart's 
Constitutional Right To Trial By Jury, And Special Law 
Clauses Of The Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Constitution guarantees the right of a jury trial 
in civil cases.28 
^InternationalHarvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418,421 (Utah 1981). 
Other states with similar guarantees have held that this right includes the right to have the jury determine damages. See 
e.g. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 592 So. 2d 156, 162 (Ala. 1991); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 
757 P.2d 251,258-59 (Kan. 1988). In Moore, the court stated: 
Because the statute caps the jury's verdict automatically and absolutely, the jury's function, to the extent the 
verdict exceeds the damages ceiling, assumes less than an advisory status. This . . . is insufficient to satisfy the 
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The Utah Constitution also forbids the legislature to enact 
a "private or special law . . . where a general law can be 
applicable." Art. VI, § 26. A "special law" applies only "to 
persons . . . though not particularized, [that] are separated by 
any method of selection from the whole class to which the law 
might, but for such legislation, be applied." Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 
1977). 
V. THE COURTS JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PREJUDGMENT AND 
POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
A. Salt Lake County Is Liable For Both Pre-judgment And 
Postjudgment Interest. 
Salt Lake County is required to pay prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest just as any other liable party would. 
Where a governmental entity waives immunity for a cause of 
action, it also waives immunity from interest on a judgment for 
that cause of action. Dade County v. American Re-Insurance Co., 
467 So.2d 414, 418 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1985); Carr v. State, 451 
So.2d 1282, 1283 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). 
In Utah, this waiver is not only implicit, but is expressly 
waived by statute: 
If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
mandates of [the constitutional right to a jury trial]. 
592 So.2d at 164. The analysis of the Moore court applies to this case. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1)(b) (emphasis added). Because a 
private person sued for damages arising from personal injury is 
liable for both prejudgment and postjudgment interest pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-44 and 15-1-4, a governmental entity 
is also liable for prejudgment and post judgment interest. 
Therefore, Mr. Hart is entitled to prejudgment interest on 
all "special damages actually incurred," Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
44(1), as well as postjudgment interest on the judgment. Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2). And, for purposes of postjudgment 
interest, the amount of the judgment includes the prejudgment 
interest awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44(2). See also 
McFarlane v. Winters, 201 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah 1949) (interest 
due included as part of judgment for determining postjudgment 
interest). 
B. The Statutory Cap Does Not Limit The Amount Of 
Prejudgment Interest, Postjudgment Interest, Or Costs. 
If constitutional, the $250,000 cap does not limit the 
amount of prejudgment or postjudgment interest. The Damages Cap 
Statute only requires the court to reduce a "judgment for 
damages for personal injury" to $250,000. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-34(1)(a) (emphasis added).29 It does not require the court 
to reduce the amount of a "total judgment", or a "judgment for 
damages" or even a "judgment" (any of which could, arguably, 
In the present case, subsection (l)(a) is the operative section of the Damages Cap Statute because a judgment 
was rendered in excess of $250,000 and the district court acted to reduce that judgment, as opposed to subsection (l)(b) 
where the court would be awarding a judgment for injury or death. 
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include prejudgment and postjudgment interest), to $250,000. 
Only "damages for personal injury are reduced. 
It cannot be argued that prejudgment and postjudgment 
interest are included in "damages for personal injury." Utah's 
prejudgment interest statute recognizes that interest on a 
judgment (even if construed to be a type of damage), is clearly 
distinct from "damage for personal injury." See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-44(2)(b) (it is the duty of the court "in entering 
judgment . . . to add [prejudgment interest] to the amount of 
special damages actually incurred . . . " (emphasis added)). The 
law also recognizes that postjudgment interest has nothing to do 
with damages for personal injury. Curtin v. Department of State 
Highways, 339 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Mich. App. 1983). The same analysis 
applies to costs. Costs are "reimbursement of the expense of 
litigating the claim" and have nothing to do with damages for 
personal injury. Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Minn. 
1988) . 
In light of this Courtf s duty to interpret statutory law 
"according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable," Gleave v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., Co., 
749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den., 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988), Utah's statutory scheme clearly limits only the 
damages for personal injury, and not the separate elements of 
prejudgment, postjudgment interest and costs, when such damages 
exceed $250,000. 
48 
Although no Utah case has addressed the application of the 
Damages Cap Statute to interest on judgments. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has considered the issue. In Woods v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. Of Transp., 612 A.2d 970 (Pa. 
1992), the court held that prejudgment interest (termed "delay 
damages" in Pennsylvania) in a personal injury case against the 
state cannot be limited by the $250,000 statutory damages cap in 
Pennsylvania's Sovereign Immunity Act. Id at 971. 
Interestingly, in cases where statutory damages caps have 
been held to limit the amount of prejudgment interest, it is 
because the wording limits prejudgment interest. See, e.g., 
Wilmer v. Board of County Commissioners, 916 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 
(D. Kan. 1996) (noting that Kansas1 damage cap statute expressly 
limits the award of prejudgment interest30) , and Huff v. State, 
764 P.2d 183, 187 (Okl. 1988) ( denying prejudgment interest in 
excess of statutory damages cap where statute limits the "total 
liability of the state" [rather than a judgment for damages for 
personal injury]). 
Absent statutory language to the contrary, courts generally 
hold that statutory damage caps do not limit postjudgment 
interest.31 These authorities establish that the Trial Court 
30
 K.S.A. § 75-6105 (Kansas' damage cap statute states that "[a] governmental entity shall not be liable for.. . 
interest prior to judgment.") 
See, e.g., Wilmer, 916 F. Supp. at 1081 ("Court would not allow the County to avoid paying interest and costs 
on the judgment, even in light of the statutory cap."); Montgomery Hosp. v. Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 668 A.2d 
221,223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (state is liable for postjudgment interest even though payment of such interest would require 
state to pay in excess of statutory limit.), and Elmore County Comm 'n v. Ragona, 561 So.2d 1092,1095 (Ala. 1990) (state 
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erred in applying the Damages Cap Statute to bar Mr. Hart from 
recovering prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest and 
costs. 
CONCLUSION 
To apply the Damages Cap Statute in this case and thereby 
diminish the jury!s verdict in favor of Mr. Hart from $678,300 
to $250,000 would violate substantial and fundamental rights 
under the Utah Constitution. 
Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff 
against Salt Lake County in the full amount of the jury's 
verdict of $678,300, together with pre- and post-judgment 
interest. 
DATED this ^7 day of December, 1996. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, P.C, 
QjtfuuA injury 
:orneys for Plaintiff, Richard 
S. Hart 
is liable for postjudgment interest to the same extent as any private judgment debtor and such interest is not subject to 
statutory damage cap). 
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